The ongoing conflict in India's northeastern region encapsulates a complex web of historical grievances, ethnic identities, and international interventions. Among the various militant organisations involved, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Manipur stands out due to its unique origins and evolution over the years.
The PLA was established on September 25, 1978, by N. Bisheshwar Singh, breaking away from the United National Liberation Front (UNLF). What makes the PLA's origin unique: its founders, known as the "Ojhas", underwent two years of indoctrination and guerrilla training in China's Yunnan province before returning to launch their separatist campaign in Manipur. The organisation was deliberately named after China's People's Liberation Army, reflecting its ideological alignment with Marxist-Leninist ideology and socialist revolution doctrine. The group's founding manifesto sought to organise a revolutionary front encompassing the entire Northeast, uniting Meiteis, Nagas, and Kukis under one anti-India liberation struggle. However, despite claiming to be "trans-tribal," the PLA remains dominated by Imphal Valley-based Meitei Hindu insurgents.
By 1989, the PLA established its political wing, the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF), which later set up a government-in-exile in Bangladesh (Sylhet district), providing a shadow state apparatus for legitimacy and international outreach. The military structure: - Military Divisions: 4 operational divisions covering Sadar Hill West, Eastern Valley, Hill Areas, and Imphal Valley - Command Structure: Each division has a commander, lieutenants, sergeants, and lance corporals - Estimated Strength~500 active cadres (2025); previously 3,800 (2008 estimates) Safe Havens: Myanmar (Sagaing Division), Bangladesh (Sylhet)
The PLA has evolved from a dormant organisation (2015-2020) into an operationally aggressive force, particularly since the 2023 Meitei-Kuki ethnic violence. Recent intelligence assessments identify the group as highly trained in guerrilla warfare, equipped with sophisticated arms including AK-series rifles, M16 assault rifles, and looted INSAS weapons from Indian military armouries. Most significantly, in November 2025, the PLA executed "Operation Lang Ol," conducting the first confirmed drone-assisted attack against Indian security forces. The pre-dawn assault on an Assam Rifles outpost in Tengnoupal district near the Indo-Myanmar border resulted in four casualties and represented a qualitative shift in militant capability, evidence that the organisation has acquired or sourced unmanned aerial vehicle technology through its international backers.
The Churachandpur ambush killed an Assam Rifles Commanding Officer, his wife, and his child. Deliberate targeting of families. Parallel to this, PLA runs parallel training camps, weaponising youth, 80-90 youths trained in PLA camps annually. The group has crossed from insurgency into state-level terror organisation tactics.
The PLA sustains operations through a sophisticated, multi-vector funding model identified through National Investigation Agency (NIA) and Enforcement Directorate (ED) probes: 1. Systematic Extortion & "Revolutionary Taxation" The group operates an "unauthorised taxation system" across Manipur's economy. Documented collections include: - Highway toll taxes: Rs 8.5-9 lakh annually from goods-carrying vehicles on National Highways - Tobacco/betel nut transporters: Rs 7 lakh+ annually - Educational institutions: Rs 1+ crore from schools, colleges, coaching institutes -Commercial establishments: Rs 2-3 crore from hospitals, liquor shops, sawmills - Individual extortion: Demands ranging from Rs 10 lakh to Rs 50 lakh from businessmen and landowners 2. Narcotics Trafficking Intelligence assessments indicate the PLA is integrated into Myanmar's opium-heroin trafficking network. Myanmar is the world's second-largest opium producer; the porous Indo-Myanmar border facilitates the movement of narcotics southward into India while funnelling arms northward into Myanmar-based camps. 3. Armed Robbery & Government Armoury Looting The NIA chargesheet documented instances where PLA cadres looted INSAS rifles and light machine guns from government depots, replenishing both their own arsenal and providing weapons to allied groups.
INTERNATIONAL BACKING China: The foundational connection with China remains the most distinctive aspect of the PLA's international backing. Beyond the early 1980s training in Yunnan, intelligence reports suggest the Chinese People's Liberation Army continues to provide covert military instruction, small arms, and drone technology transfers to Northeast insurgent groups, including the PLA. This aligns with broader Chinese strategic interests in destabilising India's Northeast frontier.
Pakistan-ISI Nexus The PLA's connection with Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) came to public attention in January 1991, when a document was recovered from Biren Singh (alias German), the Finance Secretary of the RPF, evidencing direct ISI contact. The ISI-PLA relationship involves: Arms procurement and supply channels through Bangladesh (Dhaka-based Pakistani diplomatic missions coordinate ISI operations) - Training in guerrilla warfare and weapons handling - Financial assistance for operational and recruitment expansion - Coordination with other ISI-backed insurgent groups in Northeast India
Myanmar Following the Myanmar military coup in February 2021, the PLA exploited the resulting political chaos to expand and fortify its camps. The Sagaing Division, where the PLA maintains strongholds at Min Thar (1.45 km from the Manipur border), Thuambual, and Thanang village, has become an ungoverned space where the militant outfit operates with relative impunity.
RECENT INTELLIGENCE FINDINGS (2024-2025)
1. Recruitment During Ethnic Violence
Following the May 2023 Meitei-Kuki ethnic violence, the PLA undertook aggressive recruitment drives among "impressionable youths." The NIA documented that highly trained PLA operatives like Moirangthem Anand Singh organised 80-90 youths in firearms-training camps during July 2023, explicitly to escalate ethnic tensions and conduct terror attacks targeting the rival Kuki-Zo community.
2. Myanmar-Based Leadership Coordination
The NIA assessed that the PLA's central leadership, operating from Myanmar camps, authorises major operations but may not have sanctioned all recent attacks. Evidence suggests some operations are conducted by splinter groups, or alternatively, involve "contract-style killings" designed to destabilise governance in Manipur. The ambiguity reflects the organisation's fluid structure and shifting cadre loyalties.
3. NSCN(IM) Logistical Support
Despite being a signatory to India's 2015 Framework Agreement, the NSCN(IM) has not dismantled its militant infrastructure. Active cadres assist in training and arming ULFA-I and PLA fighters. Arrests throughout 2024-2025 in Assam and Nagaland have uncovered intermediaries and linkmen acting as couriers for funds, arms, and intelligence between ULFA-I and PLA.
Conclusion
The PLA represents a sophisticated transnational separatist insurgency with established training infrastructure, international backing (China, Pakistan, Myanmar), coordinated alliance structures, and demonstrated capability to acquire advanced weaponry, including drones. The organisation's ability to sustain itself through extortion & narcotics trafficking creates a self-perpetuating militant economy resistant to conventional counter-insurgency.
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